The impact of state ownership on share price informativeness: The case of the Split Share Structure Reform in China  by Hou, Wenxuan et al.
The British Accounting Review 44 (2012) 248–261Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectThe British Accounting Review
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/locate/barThe impact of state ownership on share price informativeness: The case
of the Split Share Structure Reform in Chinaq
Wenxuan Hou a, Jing-Ming Kuo b, Edward Lee c,*
a The University of Edinburgh Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh EH8 9JS, UK
bDurham Business School, Durham University, Mill Hill Lane, Durham DH1 3LB, UK
cAccounting and Finance Division, Manchester Business School, The University of Manchester, Crawford House, Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, UKa r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 29 July 2010
Received in revised form 2 April 2012
Accepted 5 April 2012
JEL Code:
G14
G15
G30
G38
Keywords:
State ownership
Share price informativeness
Split Share Structure Reform
Chinaq The authors would like to thank the Editors, two
Annual Meetings at Aarhus, Denmark for useful com
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ44 161 275 4564.
E-mail address: edward.lee@mbs.ac.uk (E. Lee).
0890-8389  2012 Elsevier Ltd.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bar.2012.09.003
Open access under CC a b s t r a c t
This study examines the impact of state ownership on share price informativeness using
the unique setting of the Split Share Structure Reform in China. This reform abolishes the
trading restriction on shares held mainly by state shareholders. In doing so, it renders state
shareholders’ wealth more sensitive to share price movements and decreases their conﬂict
of interests with private shareholders. This change is expected to strengthen the corporate
governance incentives of state shareholders and reduce the information asymmetry in
Chinese listed ﬁrms. This prediction is conﬁrmed through empirical evidence of increased
share price informativeness among ﬁrms that are more sensitive to the impact of this
reform, i.e. those with more state ownership or restricted shares. These ﬁndings imply that
this reform beneﬁts the information environment and minority shareholders in the
Chinese stock market.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
China’s Split Share Structure Reform (e.g. Firth, Lin, & Zou, 2010) that started in 2005 marks a major change in the
institutional setting of the Chinese stock market. Prior to this reform, state shareholders mainly held restricted shares that
could not be freely traded in the stockmarket in the sameway as shares held by private shareholders. This created a conﬂict of
interest between state and private shareholders, since share price movements in the capital market did not affect the wealth
of the former. As a result, the widespread concentration of state ownership in Chinese listed ﬁrms (e.g. Allen, Qian, & Qian,
2005) induced a lower incentive alignment effect and a greater entrenchment effect, which in turn reduced corporate
governance and transparency (e.g. Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 2010). The reform abolishes this split share structure and causes state
shareholders’ wealth to become sensitive to share price movements. This should align the incentives of state and private
shareholders to monitor and ensure managers maximize the market value of their ﬁrms.
This study examines whether the reform has improved the corporate transparency of Chinese listed ﬁrms through their
share price informativeness. This is an important question because corporate transparency facilitates the efﬁcient allocationanonymous referees, as well as participants at the European Financial Management Association 2010
ments.
BY license.
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interest among academics, policy makers, and practitioners in the economic development of China, this study provides
empirical evidence verifying the impact of a major reform on the information environment of the Chinese capital market.
Contributing to the corporate governance literature, which largely focuses on developed countries (e.g. Dennis & McConnell,
2003), this study provides empirical evidence from an emerging country with a unique research setting of an exogenously
reduced conﬂict of interests between shareholders.
The inﬂuence of governance mechanisms on corporate transparency is well established in the literature (see Section
2.2 for a review). The separation of ownership and control leads to information asymmetry between corporate insiders
and external stakeholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers and controlling owners, with more opportunities to
expropriate wealth from outside investors, have greater incentives to conceal their self-serving deeds by withholding
information or window-dressing performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Such opportunistic behaviors should reduce
when corporate governance becomes more effective. This should also increase the information content and credibility of
ﬁrms’ disclosure, causing more ﬁrm-speciﬁc information to be included in the share price. Thus, increased share price
informativeness among Chinese listed ﬁrms, following the Split Share Structure Reform, could reﬂect a corporate
governance improvement.
This corporate governance effect is generated mainly through the incentive alignment between controlling and minority
shareholders and not necessarily through changes in ownership structure or control. Such alignment occurs despite the
reform’s gradual implementation process (see Section 2.3 for details) and applies to state shareholders who do not imme-
diately sell their shares. There is the concern that this incentive alignment might not be realized if state shareholders do not
believe that the Chinese government will relinquish its control on listed ﬁrms and thus that the tradability of their shares is
only symbolic. This concern is mitigated in twoways. First, well-established government policy seeks to focus state inﬂuence
on strategically important sectors only. Second, media anecdotal evidence conﬁrms that some state shareholders have begun
actively trading their shares following the lifting of restrictions.
Given the aforementioned arguments, this study hypothesizes that the Split Share Structure Reform should increase
the share price informativeness of Chinese listed ﬁrms, especially those with a higher proportion of state or restricted
shares, since the impact of the reform is expected to be more pronounced among such ﬁrms. To test this assertion, this
study samples Chinese ﬁrms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges over the period of 2001 to 2008.1
Among ﬁrms with a higher proportion of state or restricted shares, the empirical analyses reveal lower share price
informativeness prior to the reform and a greater increase in share price informativeness following the reform. These
results are robust to the control of ﬁrm characteristics and governance variables, as well as industry and regional effects.
These ﬁndings are also not sensitive to estimating share price informativeness by alternative models and data
frequencies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature and hypotheses. Section 3 describes the
sample and methodologies. Section 4 presents the empirical ﬁndings. Section 5 concludes.2. Literature and hypotheses
2.1. Ownership structure and corporate governance
Ownership structure affects corporate governance through two opposing effects: incentive alignment and
entrenchment. The incentive alignment effect occurs when the proﬁt, or ﬁrm value, maximization objective of the
minority shareholders is consistent with that of large shareholders, who in turn also have more expertise and capability
to monitor managers (e.g. Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). Empirical evidence conﬁrms this by showing that ﬁrms with large
shareholders are associated with higher management turnover (Kang & Shivdasani, 1995) and tighter executive
compensation control (Hartzell & Starks, 2003). Gomes (2000) suggests that a high degree of ownership concentration
also serves as a signal for reputation-building by controlling owners. In this context, large shareholders have more to
lose from a decline in their ﬁrm’s value than they could gain from diverting their ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow into their own
pockets.
The entrenchment effect of large shareholders is conceptually similar to the effect when managerial ownership is
high. Theoretical (e.g. Stulz, 1988) and empirical (e.g. McConnell & Servaes, 1990) studies suggest that managers with
a greater degree of ownership have more incentive to expropriate the wealth of outside shareholders, which in turn
reduces the value of the ﬁrm. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large shareholders who gain effective control of
a ﬁrm’s management also have a greater incentive to pursue their own interests, which are not necessarily the
interests of other investors. Johnson, La Porta, Lopez de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) conﬁrm that controlling share-
holders transfer assets and proﬁts out of the ﬁrm for their own beneﬁt, and call this “tunneling”. Claessens,1 In 2007, China imposed mandatory adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on all listed ﬁrms. As a robustness check, this
study excludes the time period in which IFRS is expected to inﬂuence share price movements and acquire similar results supporting the main inference of
the Split Share Structure Reform effect (see Section 4.2.4).
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cash-ﬂow rights.
2.2. Corporate governance and transparency
Empirical studies conﬁrm the role of corporate governance in determining corporate transparency.2 Beasley (1996) shows
that ﬁrms with more independent boards, a greater degree of outside director ownership, and longer outside director tenure
are associated with less ﬁnancial statement fraud. Dechow, Sloan, and Hutton (1996) show that ﬁrms manipulating earnings
are more likely to be those with less independent boards or CEO duality. Klein (2002) documents a negative relationship
between abnormal accruals and the independence of the audit committee or board. Ajinkya, Bhojraj, and Sengupta (2005)
ﬁnd that ﬁrms with more outside directors and a greater degree of institutional ownership are more likely to issue
management earnings forecasts that are more accurate and less optimistically biased. Armstrong, Balakrishnan, and Cohen
(2010) ﬁnd that information asymmetry has decreased and ﬁnancial statement informativeness increased following the
passing of anti-takeover laws.
The positive relationship between governance and corporate transparency is also largely conﬁrmed in China. For instance,
Yuan, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) provide evidence of greater earnings management among Chinese state-controlled listed
ﬁrms. They interpret this as evidence of a greater entrenchment effect than incentive alignment effect from the large
shareholders of state-controlled ﬁrms. Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008) ﬁnd that Chinese state-controlled listed ﬁrms are more
likely to hire small audit ﬁrms within the same region. They argue that the collusion incentive between ﬁrms and auditors to
cover up earnings manipulation could be a possible explanation for this pattern. Gul et al. (2010) document less share price
informativeness among Chinese ﬁrms with a higher degree of ownership concentration. They also show that foreign
ownership and auditor quality are inversely related to share price informativeness.
2.3. Split Share Structure Reform in China
In 1978, China began to make major reforms to its economy, moving from a centrally planned to a market oriented
economy. After the stock market was established in the early 1990s, it imposed a split share structure that divided the shares
of listed ﬁrms into restricted and tradable. Restricted shares are classiﬁed as either state or legal person shares, and are largely
held by central or local government-afﬁliated shareholders either through government bureaucratic agencies or state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).3 They can only be transferred with the authorities’ approval, at a price close to the book value of the ﬁrm,
or auctioned at a heavily discounted value (e.g. Huang & Xu, 2009) relative to the freely tradable shares in the same ﬁrm. In
either case, the shares are still untradeable after changing hands.
To further reform the capital market, the Chinese government has been keen to abolish this approach. On 29th April 2005,
the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced its policy intention to implement the conversion of restricted
shares into freely-traded shares, which would be carried out gradually on selected batches of ﬁrms until all listed ﬁrms in
China had been covered. Two initial batches of ﬁrms were selected on 9th May and 19th June 2005 for a pilot. On 4th
September 2005, ofﬁcial documents were released (i.e. Administration Measures for the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed
Firms) to provide implementation procedures and detailed instructions for the full market-wide reform.
When a ﬁrm is selected to carry out the reform, it begins a gradual process that starts with the negotiation of
a compensation payout plan with the existing freely tradable shareholders (e.g. Cumming & Hou, in press; Firth et al., 2010).
The restricted shares paid out as part of the compensation to this latter group of shareholders become immediately tradable.
Over the next 36 months, the proportion of restricted shares that are tradable increases. All restricted shares become fully
tradable in the stock market 36 months after the ratiﬁcation of the compensation payout plan. By the end of 2008, most
Chinese listed ﬁrms had completed the ratiﬁcation of their compensation payout plans and had begun enacting the gradual
abolishment of their restricted shares. By the end of 2011, majority of listed ﬁrms in China would no longer have restricted
shares.
2.4. Hypothesis development
Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform of 2005, state ownership was maintained through restricted shares. This insu-
lated the state shareholders from the wealth implications of the stock return performance of their ﬁrms. As a result, state
shareholders were more interested in pursuing political credits, acquired when their ﬁrm carried out government initiatives,
or in cash dividend payouts received if the ﬁrm achieved certain operating performance targets. However, the government
initiatives were not necessarily in the interest of minority shareholders and operating performance could be achieved
through earnings management. Thus, the split share structure tilted the effect of state ownership concentration on Chinese
listed ﬁrms, away from incentive alignment and toward entrenchment, having an adverse effect on the governance of these2 The literature also suggests that a better corporate information environment in turn improves the ability of outside investors to discipline insiders
through share price and/or efﬁcient contracting (e.g. Bushman & Smith, 2001).
3 Private investors can also hold legal person shares.
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(Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2006) and that restricted shareholders preferred cash over stock dividends (Wei & Xiao, 2009).
The Split Share Structure Reform induces an exogenous alignment of the incentives of state and private shareholders in
Chinese listed ﬁrms. It renders the wealth of state shareholders sensitive to share return performance in the capital
market, as is the case for private shareholders. This reduction in the previous conﬂict of interests between the two
shareholder groups is expected to strengthen their joint effort to ensure managers maximize the market value of the ﬁrm.
To achieve this, they must strengthen corporate governance and reduce managers’ opportunities to expropriate wealth
from the ﬁrm at the expense of outside investors. This in turn reduces the incentive and need for managers and controlling
owners to withhold and/or manipulate price-sensitive information. The effect should be more pronounced among ﬁrms
with a higher proportion of state ownership or restricted shares. Given these arguments, this study tests the following two
hypotheses:
H1: Prior to the Split Share Structure Reform, Chinese listed ﬁrms with more state ownership or restricted shares had lower share
price informativeness.
H2: Following the Split Share Structure Reform, Chinese listed ﬁrms with more state ownership or restricted shares are associated
with a greater increase in share price informativeness.
One possible critique against hypothesis H2 is that, despite the lifting of trading restrictions, state shareholders will still
not sell their shares due to the government’s desire to retain state control of listed ﬁrms. If this is the case, the reform will
lead to a limited incentive alignment effect. However, there are four main counter-arguments against this speciﬁc critique.
First, the Chinese government has a well-established policy, known as “Zhua Da Fang Xiao” (or literally “grasp big and release
small”), which calls for a gradual focus of its control on the listed ﬁrms of strategically vital sectors only (e.g. energy,
transportation, defence, etc) and encourages the relaxation of its involvement in less important businesses.4 In fact, Chen,
Firth, Xin, and Xu (2008) document 62 transfers of the control of listed ﬁrms from state to private shareholders between
1996 and 2000, prior to the reform. Second, there is much anecdotal evidence in the media suggesting that previously
restricted shares held by state shareholders have been actively traded in the stock market following this reform.5 Third, even
state shareholders who do not sell their shares immediately once trading is allowed can still have an incentive to see an
increase in their ﬁrm’s market value. Such shareholders could be holding on to their shares because they see the prospect of
long-term growth in their ﬁrm’s market value and they would therefore be willing to contribute toward realizing this
expectation. Fourth, the corporate governance beneﬁt that is expected from this reform is achieved directly through the
alignment of incentives between state and private shareholders, and is not dependent on a change in ownership structure
from state to private shareholders.
Another potential critique of hypothesis H2 is that the incentive alignment effect will not occur until all the restricted
shares of a ﬁrm have become fully tradable, 36 months after the ratiﬁcation of the compensation plan in the reform
process. Based on this argument, it would only be possible to study the effect of the reform across all ﬁrms in the Chinese
stock market using a post-2011 sample. However, this argument is based on the narrow assumption that all restricted
shareholders are myopic and do not plan ahead. The CSRC’s policy announcement, piloting, and issue of guidelines during
2005 made clear the government’s intention to carry out the reform across all Chinese listed ﬁrms. It would thus be in the
best interests of the restricted shareholders to increase their ﬁrms’ market value before the restricted shares became
eligible for trading in order to maximize their proﬁt once trading was allowed. Also, as mentioned in Section 2.3, restricted
shareholders can trade at least a proportion of their holdings within the 36-month horizon. Thus, the argument that
incentive alignment occurs only after this horizon neglects the wealth implications of rising share prices for the restricted
shareholders over this period.
Finally, one confounding effect that may inﬂuence part of the post-reform period is the mandatory convergence of
Chinese accounting standards with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from 2007 onward. If the IFRS
indeed strengthen Chinese listed ﬁrms’ accounting quality, then this may also improve ﬁrm-speciﬁc disclosure and the
information environment. However, an international study across 51 countries including China, by Daske, Hail, Leuz, and
Verdi (2008), reveals that the IFRS have an effect only in countries where ﬁrms have an incentive to be transparent and
where legal enforcement is strong. Thus, given the consensus in the literature that China has weak investor protection and
weak legal enforcement, its mandatory IFRS adoption is not expected to have an immediate and systematic impact on
listed ﬁrms (e.g. see Chen & Cheng, 2007). Indeed, He, Wong, and Young (2009) provide empirical evidence that the
mandatory adoption of IFRS has not improved the earnings quality of Chinese ﬁrms. Their result reduces the possibility
that the evidence in support of the prediction in hypothesis H2 could be attributed to the mandatory IFRS adoption instead4 For instance, this policy was mentioned in the Ninth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Outline for the Long-Range
Objective Through the Year 2010.
5 A few recent ﬁnancial news articles are listed here, translating their Chinese language headlines into English, and provide their web URLs for reference:
 “29 ﬁrms this year experienced local government stock ownership reduction” http://ﬁnance.ifeng.com/stock/zqyw/20110827/4474686.shtml. “Selling
shares – July wave of government stock ownership reduction” http://stock.hexun.com/2011-07-29/131890710.html. “July’s local government stock
ownership reduction in 25 listed ﬁrms to cash in 3.3 billion RMB” http://www.beelink.com/20110808/2808514.shtml.
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excluding the time period in which mandatory IFRS adoption would affect the share prices of Chinese listed ﬁrms (see
Section 4.2.4).3. Methodology and sample
3.1. Test of hypotheses
Existing literature (e.g. Roll, 1988) suggests that the proportion of stock return variations not attributed to market-wide
information indicates the rate at which private information is incorporated into stock prices through trading. Firm-speciﬁc
return variation has been widely adopted in the literature as a proxy for share price informativeness, to examine corpo-
rate transparency.6 In this study, the empirical tests of hypotheses H1 and H2 are carried out through regressions based on
Equation (1) below:
ji;t ¼ a0 þ a1RATIOi;t þ a2SSSRi;t þ a3RATIOi;t  SSSRi;t þ a4 ln Sizei;t þ a5MBi;t þ a6LEVi;t þ a7IROAi;t þ a8VOLi;t
þ a9CHOLDi;t þ a10CDUALi;t þ a11BINDPi;t þ a12BSIZEi;t þ Industryþ Areaþ 3i;t ð1Þ
The dependent variable Ji,t is the share price informativeness measure of ﬁrm i in year t, derived either from Chinese
domestic stock market returns only or from both Chinese domestic and US stock market returns, following Fernandes and
Ferreira (2008). The latter captures return variations due to market-wide information in the US, on which the exports of
Chinese ﬁrms are highly dependent. To identify ﬁrms with greater sensitivity to the reform, RATIOi,t is deﬁned either as the
ratio of state to total shares (STATE) or the ratio of restricted to total shares (RESTRICT).7 To capture the impact of the
reform, SSSRi,t is deﬁned as equal to 1 for the years 2006–2008, and to 0 for the years 2001–2005. As discussed in Sections
2.3 and 2.4, the CSRC’s policy announcement, piloting, and issue of guidelines in 2005 should have already sent clear
signals to the market about the impending reform across all listed ﬁrms. Assuming state shareholders are forward-looking
and not myopic, these market-wide signals should have started to invoke the incentive alignment effect between them
and the private shareholders from 2006 onward, even among ﬁrms not immediately selected by the CSRC to undergo the
reform. As a robustness test, these analyses are replicated by substituting SSSRi,t with another variable, REFORMi,t, which
equals 1 from the year in which the compensation payout plan was ratiﬁed for the ﬁrm in question and for all years
afterward, and 0 for the years before this. The SSSRi,t variable captures the market-wide effect from 2006 onward while
REFORMi,t variable captures the ﬁrm-speciﬁc effect from the year in which a ﬁrm is chosen to implement the process
onward. The control variables included in this study is broadly similar to those in Gul et al. (2010).8 lnSIZEi,t is the market
capitalization of the ﬁrm. MBi,t is measured as market-to-book ratio. LEVi,t is measured as debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROAi,t
is the industry median-adjusted return on assets, measured by operating income divided by total assets. VOLi,t is the
trading volume, measured as turnover, which is the number of shares traded, as a percentage of the total tradable shares.
Corporate governance variables are included as further controls, based on its link with ﬁrm transparency as established in
Section 2.2. CHOLDi,t is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings above the top 75th or below the bottom 25th
percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. A low level of CEO ownership reduces the incentive alignment with
shareholders and a high level induces entrenchment. Thus, both effects increase agency problems. CDUALi,t is 1 for ﬁrms
whose CEO also serves as board chairman and 0 otherwise. CEOs who also serve as chairman of the board have the power
to reduce the effectiveness with which boards monitor them. BINDPi,t is 1 for ﬁrms whose proportion of independent
directors is above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Independent shareholders are assumed to have
greater incentive and expertise to monitor managers. BSIZEi,t is 1 for ﬁrms whose board size is above the yearly cross-
sectional median and 0 otherwise. Finally, Industry and Area are industry and regional effects. Industry is deﬁned
according to the ﬁrst two digits of the GICS (Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard) code. Region is deﬁned according to
Firth et al. (2006), who group ﬁrms into four different regions based on economic development level.9 For brevity the
coefﬁcients of the ten industry dummy variables and three regional dummy variables estimated from these regression
analyses are not reported in the tables.
Coefﬁcient a1 indicates the relationship between share price informativeness and ﬁrms that are assumed to have had
a greater conﬂict of interests between dominant and minority shareholders before the reform. Given the argument that state
ownership and restricted shares reduce corporate governance, which in turn reduces corporate transparency, a1 is expected
to be negative. This ﬁndingwould conﬁrm the prediction in hypothesis H1 andwould also be broadly similar to the ﬁndings of6 Some recent studies include Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003), Jin and Myers (2006), Fernandes and Ferreira
(2008), and Gul et al. (2010).
7 In calculating the ratio of state to total shares this study excludes state ownership held via legal person shares.
8 Gul et al. (2010) also test the effect of foreign shareholding and ownership concentration on the share price informativeness of Chinese listed ﬁrms. In
untabulated tests these variables are included as additional control variables and all ﬁndings remain robust. However, due to data availability, these
variables reduce sample size and are thus not included in the main analyses.
9 These include (1) Shanghai and Shenzen, (2) more developed areas including open cities and provinces along the coast, (3) inland provinces, and (4)
least developed areas in the north-western regions.
Table 1
Sample and summary statistics.
Panel A annual number of ﬁrm-year observations
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total
Obs. 1044 1123 1207 1320 1324 1316 1272 1265 9871
Panel B summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Standard deviation 25th Percentile 50th Percentile 75th Percentile
J1 9871 2.3677 1.5891 1.3300 1.9523 2.9037
J2 9871 1.9627 1.1493 1.1590 1.7048 2.5126
STATE 9871 0.3181 0.2508 0.0142 0.3406 0.5360
RESTRICT 9871 0.5352 0.1627 0.4377 0.5662 0.6546
lnSIZE 9871 20.5602 1.0001 19.8700 20.4545 21.1187
MB 9871 3.6669 4.0470 1.7092 2.5697 4.2672
LEV 9871 0.5183 0.2641 0.3626 0.5047 0.6326
IROA 9871 0.0014 0.0196 0.0048 0.0001 0.0068
VOL 9871 4.5726 3.5506 1.9639 3.3750 6.0372
CEO ownership 9871 0.0019 0.0161 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
CEO duality 9871 0.0100 0.0996 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Board independence 9871 0.4758 0.2172 0.4000 0.5000 0.5714
Board size 9871 6.7337 2.0049 6.0000 6.0000 8.0000
This table presents the yearly sample (Panel A) and summary statistics (Panel B). The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after
the launch of the Split Share Structure Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints were no longer imposed on them, and they were not
affected by the reform. J1 (J2) is a share price informativeness measure derived from the residual variances of time-series regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
weekly excess returns on Chinese (both Chinese and US) stock market weekly excess returns. STATE (RESTRICT) is the ratio of state shares (restricted
shares) to the total shares of the listed ﬁrm. lnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total-assets ratio.
IROA is the industry median-adjusted return on assets, measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover.
CEO ownership is number of shares held by CEO divided by total number of shares. CEO duality is 1 for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as chairperson of the
board. Board independence is the number of independent directors relative to the total number of directors on the board. Board size is the number of
directors on the board.
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a3 indicates the incremental relationship after the reform between share price informativeness and ﬁrms that are assumed to
bemore sensitive to the abolishment of restricted shares. To conﬁrm the prediction of hypothesisH2, onemust observe a3> 0.
This will indicate incrementally higher share price informativeness following the reform among ﬁrms with either higher state
ownership or a higher proportion of restricted shares, which are expected to be more sensitive to the abolition of the split
share structure. Consistent inferences drawn from alternative share price informativeness measures will strengthen the
robustness of these ﬁndings.
By following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), stock price informativeness of ﬁrm i for year t is estimated from a time-series
regression of the 52 ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly excess returns on the corresponding weekly excess returns of different market
portfolios:
ri;t ¼ b0 þ b1rmCNt þ 3i;t (2)
ri;t ¼ b0 þ b1rmCNt þ b2rmUSt þ 3i;t (3)
where ri,t is the weekly stock return of ﬁrm i in week tminus the seven-day interbank offered rate in China, which is a proxy
for the risk-free rate; rmCNt is the weekly return of the Shanghai Composite Index minus the seven-day interbank rate in
China; rmUSt is the weekly excess return of the US stockmarkets, which is calculated as the value-weighted return on all NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates). Equation (2) considers the
systematic stock returns of the Chinese stock market index. Equation (3) follows Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) to further
account for the systematic stock returns of the US market. Since the US is China’s largest trading partner, it makes sense to
account for this source of stock return variation. Each ﬁrm-speciﬁc time-series regression produces a goodness-of-ﬁt measure
ðR2i;tÞ. The relative ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variation is then computed as the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility,
which is precisely equivalent to 1 R2i;t . Following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), a logistic transformation is then imple-
mented on 1 R2i;t :
ji;t ¼ log
 
1 R2i;t
R2i;t
!
(4)
The dependent variableJi,t of Equation (1) therefore measures ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return variation relative to market-wide
variation. The stock price informativeness measures based on the R2i;t values derived from Equations (2) and (3) are denoted as
J1 and J2 respectively.
Table 2
Regression analyses using ratio of state to total shares.
Panel A: J1 Panel B: J2
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Intercept 13.3195 (34.79)*** 13.2048 (25.18)*** 11.0631 (18.34)*** 9.5259 (34.55)*** 9.4730 (28.11)*** 8.5891 (14.13)***
STATE 0.2375 (3.07)*** 0.1821 (2.36)** 0.1670 (2.91)*** 0.1640 (2.86)*** 0.1224 (2.15)** 0.1457 (2.38)**
SSSR 0.9865 (16.66)*** 0.985 (16.47)*** 0.6070 (12.06)*** 0.4779 (11.43)*** 0.4742 (11.26)*** 0.2484 (3.73)***
STATE  SSSR 0.5742 (4.60)*** 0.5824 (4.67)*** 0.4737 (5.58)*** 0.5163 (5.79)*** 0.5264 (5.92)*** 0.5590 (5.45)***
lnSIZE 0.5496 (28.81)*** 0.5453 (28.32)*** 0.4367 (28.98)*** 0.3769 (27.19)*** 0.3719 (26.56)*** 0.3328 (16.52)***
MB 0.0098 (2.33)** 0.0073 (1.70)* 0.0049 (1.14) 0.0046 (1.49) 0.0026 (0.85) 0.0057 (1.32)
LEV 0.4584 (6.77)*** 0.4710 (6.95)*** 0.5331 (7.47)*** 0.2744 (5.71)*** 0.2830 (5.83)*** 0.3426 (5.02)***
IROA 3.3035 (3.23)*** 3.2049 (3.13)*** 3.3635 (4.37)*** 2.6409 (3.62)*** 2.5475 (3.47)*** 2.9834 (4.14)***
VOL 0.0686 (13.50)*** 0.0677 (13.27)*** 0.0435 (10.23)*** 0.0407 (10.91)*** 0.0399 (10.69)*** 0.0291 (9.68)***
CHOLD 0.0225 (0.64) 0.0148 (0.43) 0.0169 (0.58) 0.0290 (1.10) 0.0250 (0.97) 0.0062 (0.28)***
CDUAL 0.1707 (1.26) 0.1926 (1.40) 0.1542 (0.97) 0.0848 (0.79) 0.1031 (0.96) 0.1297 (1.05)
BINDP 0.1529 (3.53)*** 0.1607 (3.74)*** 0.1166 (4.00)*** 0.1385 (4.45)*** 0.1453 (4.71)*** 0.1265 (3.91)***
BSIZE 0.0047 (0.14) 0.0021 (0.06) 0.0271 (0.94) 0.0099 (0.39) 0.0146 (0.58) 0.0113 (0.43)
Industry effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
BSQREG No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.138 0.1414 0.1086 0.1122
Pseudo R2 0.0737 0.0594
Observations 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are no longer imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. The dependent
variable in Panel A (B) is the share price informativeness measureJ1 (J2) derived from residual variances of time-series regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly
excess returns on Chinese (both Chinese and US) stockmarket weekly excess returns. STATE is the ratio of state shares to total shares in the listed ﬁrm. SSSR is
1 for the years 2006–2008, and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is debt-to-total-assets ratio.
IROA is the industry median-adjusted return on assets, measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover.
CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1
for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with proportion of independent directors above the yearly cross-
sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with board size above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region
effect indicate whether these effects are controlled for in the analyses. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region
classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al. (2006). For brevity the coefﬁcients of the 10 industry dummy variables and 3 regional dummy variables are not reported.
Regression 1 (2) exclude (include) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2. Regression 3 uses bootstrapped median regression
(BSQREG) and reports pseudo R2. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and
*** indicates signiﬁcance to 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively.
W. Hou et al. / The British Accounting Review 44 (2012) 248–261254As robustness tests, the hypotheses tests are also replicated on share price informativeness estimated from daily returns
using Equations (2) and (3) as well as alternative model speciﬁcations that account for systematic stock return variations in
industry indices (rindt), the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) World Index ðrmWt Þ, and the Chinese A ðrmCNAt Þ, B
ðrmCNBt Þ and H ðrmCNHt Þ share indices, as in Gul et al. (2010) 10:
ri;t ¼ b0 þ b1rmCNAt þ b2rmCNAt1 þ b3rindt þ b4rindt1 þ 3i;t (5)
ri;t ¼ b0 þ b1rmCNAt þ b2rmWt þ 3i;t (6a)
ri;t ¼ b0 þ b1rmCNAt þ b2rmCNBt þ b3rmWt þ 3i;t (6b)
ri;t ¼ b0 þ b1rmCNAt þ b2rmCNHt þ b3rmWt þ 3i;t (6c)10 The majority of shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges are traded in RMB and are known as A shares. However, some Chinese listed
ﬁrms also issue shares traded in US$ (on the Shanghai Stock Exchange) and HK$ (on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange) and these are known as B shares. Shares
in Chinese ﬁrms traded on the Hong Kong stock exchange in HK$ are known as H shares.
W. Hou et al. / The British Accounting Review 44 (2012) 248–261 2553.2. Sample description, summary statistics, and correlation analyses
The sample period of the analyses in this study spans from 2001 to 2008. GTA (Guo Tai An)/CSMAR (China Stock Market
and Accounting Research) and CCER (China Center of Economic Research) databases provides data for variables such as stock
returns, proportion of state shares, proportion of restricted shares, market capitalization, market-to-book value, debt-to-
equity ratio, return-on-assets ratio, trading volume, CEO ownership, CEO duality, number of outside directors, board size,
and industrial and regional classiﬁcations. Weekly returns of the Chinese domestic market are obtained fromDatastream and
weekly returns of the US stock market are obtained from CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices). The top and bottom 1
percent of these variables are winsorized to reduce the impact of outliers. The sample includes listed ﬁrms on both the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and excludes ﬁrms that were newly listed after the reformwas launched at the end
of 2005 (since such ﬁrms did not adopt a split share structure). The ﬁnal sample comprises of ﬁrmswith valid values for all the
aforementioned variables, and contains 9871 ﬁrm-year observations. Within this sample, the number of ﬁrms selected by the
CSRC to carry out the reform and have their compensation payout plans ratiﬁed by their shareholders in the years 2005, 2006,
2007, and 2008 were 224, 894, 103, and 16 respectively.
Table 1 Panel A indicates the number of ﬁrms per year in the sample, which covers the period from 2001 to 2008. Table 1
Panel B presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the analyses. The two share price informativeness measures
J1 andJ2 have medians of 1.9523 and 1.7048 respectively over the sample period. Following Fernandes and Ferreira (2008),
the values of these measures are logistically transformed ﬁrm-speciﬁc return variations relative to the market-wide return
variation (see Equation (4)). SinceJ1 accounts only for the domestic Chinese market information, it is higher thanJ2, which
also accounts for the market-wide information in the US. The median level of STATE, which is the proportion of shares held
by state-afﬁliated shareholders but excluding legal person shares, is 0.3406, is broadly similar to the ﬁgure in Gul et al.
(2010), despite of the difference in sample period with their study. This indicates that the state’s inﬂuence on Chinese
listed ﬁrms has not changed over time. The median level of restricted shares RESTRICT is 0.5662, which is higher than STATE
as it includes legal person shares. The ﬁrms have a median market-to-book ratio of 2.5697 and a volume of 3.375, both of
which are higher than the respective values in the earlier sample period used by Gul et al. (2010), reﬂecting the growth of
the Chinese economy and stock market trading activity. Table 1 also reports the summary statistics of the underlying
variables used to construct the corporate governance control variables, i.e. CHOLD, CDUAL, BINDP, and BSIZE. Average CEO
ownership is 0.19% and over 75% of ﬁrms have no executive shareholdings. Conyon and He (2008) also ﬁnd low executiveTable 3
Regression analyses using ratio of restricted to total shares.
Panel A: J1 Panel B: J2
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Intercept 13.0626 (32.16)*** 12.8234 (23.49)*** 10.8757 (23.86)*** 9.2675 (32.18)*** 9.0752 (26.20)*** 8.2169 (16.04)***
RESTRICT 0.4566 (2.83)*** 0.3862 (2.42)** 0.3525 (2.89)*** 0.3456 (2.80)*** 0.2887 (2.38)** 0.2941 (1.76)**
SSSR 0.2832 (2.47)** 0.2927 (2.57)*** 0.1345 (1.11) 0.1356 (1.58) 0.1300 (1.52) 0.2246 (1.96)*
RESTRICT  SSSR 1.8017 (8.68)*** 1.7920 (8.66)*** 1.3569 (7.72)*** 1.5846 (10.34)*** 1.5775 (10.34)*** 1.3767 (8.58)***
lnSIZE 0.5267 (28.03)*** 0.5178 (27.13)*** 0.4151 (23.28)*** 0.3561 (26.15)*** 0.3474 (25.02)*** 0.3121 (17.25)***
MB 0.0089 (2.07)** 0.0058 (1.32) 0.0016 (0.71) 0.0034 (1.07) 0.0009 (0.30) 0.0029 (0.77)
LEV 0.4165 (6.00)*** 0.4286 (6.18)*** 0.4812 (5.30)*** 0.2420 (4.92)*** 0.2509 (5.05)*** 0.3325 (6.02)***
IROA 2.4957 (2.44)** 2.3686 (2.32)** 2.7715 (3.03)*** 1.8920 (2.59)*** 1.7769 (2.42)** 2.1856 (2.98)***
VOL 0.0673 (13.17)*** 0.0664 (12.95)*** 0.0464 (12.22)*** 0.0393 (10.47)*** 0.0386 (10.27)*** 0.0308 (9.18)***
CHOLD 0.0402 (1.13) 0.0304 (0.87) 0.0127 (0.33) 0.0443 (1.66)* 0.0387 (1.48) 0.0342 (1.26)
CDUAL 0.1860 (1.37) 0.2099 (1.53) 0.1088 (0.74) 0.0980 (0.92) 0.1177 (1.10) 0.1723 (1.37)
BINDP 0.1420 (3.29)*** 0.1516 (3.53)*** 0.0842 (1.64) 0.1294 (4.17)*** 0.1374 (4.46)*** 0.1194 (4.17)***
BSIZE 0.0084 (0.25) 3.57E5 (0.00) 0.0125 (0.48) 0.0080 (0.31) 0.0139 (0.55) 0.0151 (0.64)
Industry effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Region effect No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
BSQREG No No Yes No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.1447 0.1485 0.1191 0.1232
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.0654
Observations 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871 9871
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are not imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. The dependent variable
in Panel A (B) is the share price informativeness measure J1 (J2) derived from the residual variances of time-series regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly
excess returns on Chinese (both Chinese and US) stock market weekly excess returns. RESTRICT is the ratio of restricted shares to the total number of shares
in the listed ﬁrm. SSSR is 1 for the years 2006–2008, and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalization. MB is market-to-book value. LEV is
debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROA is the industry median-adjusted return on assets, measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading
volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-
section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with the proportion of
independent directors above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with board size above the yearly cross-sectional median
and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled for in the analyses. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the
ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al. (2006). For brevity the coefﬁcients of the ten industry dummy variables and
three regional dummy variables are not reported. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2.
Regression 3 uses a bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R2. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for
Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 4
Robustness tests using ratio of state to total shares and share price informativeness estimated from daily stock returns and alternative model speciﬁcations.
J1 J2 J3 J4
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 3.5821 (17.15)*** 3.3367 (16.50)*** 3.9872 (21.78)*** 3.3473 (16.91)***
STATE 0.2148 (5.38)*** 0.2126 (5.45)*** 0.2631 (7.10)*** 0.2127 (5.46)***
SSSR 0.2063 (6.47)*** 0.1707 (5.52)*** 0.0246 (0.86) 0.1635 (5.37)***
STATE  SSSR 0.3080 (4.44)*** 0.3035 (4.55)*** 0.2971 (4.74)*** 0.3029 (4.58)***
lnSIZE 0.1848 (19.51)*** 0.1739 (18.97)*** 0.2023 (24.10)*** 0.1740 (19.33)***
MB 0.0441 (17.32)*** 0.0438 (18.09)*** 0.0396 (18.13)*** 0.0418 (17.84)***
LEV 0.9351 (21.81)*** 0.9027 (22.71)*** 0.7506 (21.83)*** 0.8815 (22.66)***
IROA 4.2091 (7.36)*** 3.9743 (7.30)*** 2.9673 (6.05)*** 3.9129 (7.31)***
VOL 0.0316 (11.35)*** 0.0359 (13.37)*** 0.0346 (13.86)*** 0.0351 (13.23)***
CHOLD 0.0279 (1.58) 0.0249 (1.44) 0.0101 (0.60) 0.0218 (1.26)
CDUAL 0.1235 (1.52) 0.1124 (1.43) 0.1198 (1.63) 0.1015 (1.33)
BINDP 0.104 (4.05)*** 0.0955 (3.84)*** 0.1233 (5.26)*** 0.1075 (4.33)***
BSIZE 0.001 (0.06) 0.0014 (0.08) 0.0083 (0.51) 0.0002 (0.01)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.231 0.2325 0.2051 0.2266
Observations 9863 9863 9863 9863
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are not imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. The dependent variables
in Regressions 1–4 are the share price informativeness measuresJ1 toJ4 respectively, estimated using daily stock returns.J1 andJ2 are respectively based
on the daily returns estimated by Equations (2) and (3). J3 is based on Equation (5) and accounts for industry-wide return variations following Gul et al.
(2010).J4 uses Equations (6a)–(6c) for Chinese listed ﬁrms that issue purely A shares, B shares, and H shares respectively. STATE is the ratio of state shares to
the total shares in the listed ﬁrm. SSSR is 1 for the years 2006–2008, and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalization.MB is the market-to-
book value. LEV is the debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROA is the industrymedian-adjusted return on assets, measured as operating income divided by total assets.
VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of
yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with proportion of
independent directors above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with board size above the yearly cross-sectional median
and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled for in the analyses. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the
ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al. (2006). For brevity the coefﬁcients of the ten industry dummy variables and
three regional dummy variables are not reported. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2.
Regression 3 uses a bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R2. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for
Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
W. Hou et al. / The British Accounting Review 44 (2012) 248–261256shareholdings in China, using a different sample period. Only 1% of ﬁrms in the sample have a CEO also serving as chair-
person of the board. On average, independent directors account for 47.58% of the board and the average board has nearly
seven directors.
For brevity, the results from the bivariate correlation analyses of the variables used in the study are not tabulated. The
share price informativeness measures (J1 andJ2) are negatively correlated with state ownership (STATE), ﬁrm size (lnSIZE),
and extreme managerial shareholdings (CHOLD). Firms with more state inﬂuence enjoy more ﬁnancial support from the
government and thus have less incentive to communicate with outside investors. Larger ﬁrms have less ﬁrm-speciﬁc vari-
ations since they contribute more to market returns in emerging markets such as China (Gul et al., 2010). Firms are less likely
to be transparent when their managers have less incentive alignment and more entrenchment. The share price informa-
tiveness measures are positively correlated with growth opportunities (MB) and leverage (LEV). Firms with higher growth
opportunities or more borrowing may volunteer to release more information to attract equity investors (Table 1).
4. Empirical ﬁndings
4.1. Main tests of hypotheses
Table 2 presents the multivariate regression analyses using the ratio of state shares to total shares to identify ﬁrms more
sensitive to the reform. Panels A and B use J1 and J2 respectively as dependent variables. In each panel, Regression 1 (2)
implements Equation (1) excluding (including) the control of industry and regional effects. Regression 3 implements Equation
(1) using a bootstrapped median regression to further control against the inﬂuence of outliers. Across all regressions in both
panels the coefﬁcient pertaining to STATE is signiﬁcantly negative. This indicates that the ﬁrms with a higher ratio of state to
total shares indeed have lower share price informativeness during the sample period before the Split Share Structure Reform,
which is 2001–2005. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the prediction in hypothesis H1 and is broadly similar to the ﬁnding of Gul et al.
(2010), which is based on an earlier period of 1996–2003. It suggests that ﬁrms with higher state ownership indeed had
a poorer information environment prior to the reform.
To the extent that the use of restricted shares to maintain state ownership contributes to this low corporate transparency,
one would expect to observe an improvement in the information environment following the Split Share Structure Reform. To
draw such an inference, it is necessary to observe signiﬁcantly greater improvement among the ﬁrms that are more sensitive
Table 5
Robustness tests using ratio of restricted to total shares and share price informativeness estimated from daily stock returns and alternative model
speciﬁcations.
J1 J2 J3 J4
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 3.4031 (14.89)*** 3.1641 (14.26)*** 4.0270 (19.83)*** 3.1610 (14.56)***
RESTRICT 0.4249 (5.29)*** 0.4125 (5.25)*** 0.5513 (7.39)*** 0.4007 (5.09)***
SSSR 0.4771 (8.13)*** 0.4895 (8.52)*** 0.6903 (12.62)*** 0.4916 (8.57)***
RESTRICT  SSSR 1.6094 (15.3)*** 1.5584 (15.27)*** 1.5345 (15.84)*** 1.5505 (15.27)***
lnSIZE 0.1679 (17.36)*** 0.1576 (16.81)*** 0.1933 (22.28)*** 0.1574 (17.12)***
MB 0.0433 (17.06)*** 0.0430 (17.86)*** 0.0395 (18.14)*** 0.0410 (17.58)***
LEV 0.9102 (21.46)*** 0.8788 (22.31)*** 0.7284 (21.35)*** 0.8579 (22.28)***
IROA 3.4741 (6.11)*** 3.2620 (6.04)*** 2.3978 (4.90)*** 3.1925 (6.01)***
VOL 0.0328 (11.97)*** 0.0370 (14.01)*** 0.0358 (14.48)*** 0.0362 (13.86)***
CHOLD 0.0100 (0.57) 0.0075 (0.44) 0.0042 (0.25) 0.0040 (0.24)
CDUAL 0.1178 (1.47) 0.1069 (1.37) 0.1128 (1.55) 0.0963 (1.29)
BINDP 0.1134 (4.46)*** 0.1046 (4.26)*** 0.1330 (5.72)*** 0.1167 (4.75)***
BSIZE 0.0073 (0.42) 0.0076 (0.44) 0.0148 (0.91) 0.0065 (0.38)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.2496 0.2507 0.2211 0.2451
Observations 9863 9863 9863 9863
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are not imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. The dependent variables
in Regressions 1 to 4 are the share price informativeness measures J1 to J4 respectively, estimated using daily stock returns. J1 and J2 are respectively
based on the daily returns estimated by Equations (2) and (3). J3 is based on Equation (5) and accounts for industry-wide return variations following Gul
et al. (2010). J4 uses Equations (6a)–(6c) for Chinese listed ﬁrms that issue purely A shares, B shares, and H shares respectively. RESTRICT is the ratio of
restricted shares to the total number of shares in the listed ﬁrm. SSSR is 1 for the years 2006–2008, and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is the natural log of market
capitalization. MB is the market-to-book value. LEV is the debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROA is the industry median-adjusted return on assets, measured as
operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings above top
75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for ﬁrmswith CEO also serving as board chairman and 0 otherwise.
BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with proportion of independent directors above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with board size
above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled for in the analyses.
The industry classiﬁcation is based on the ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al. (2006). For brevity the coefﬁcients
of the ten industry dummy variables and three regional dummy variables are not reported. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the control of industry and
regional effects and reports adjusted R2. Regression 3 uses a bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R2. All t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
respectively.
W. Hou et al. / The British Accounting Review 44 (2012) 248–261 257to the reform. Indeed, in both Panels A and B the coefﬁcients of the interaction term between STATE and SSSR are signiﬁcantly
positive. This indicates an incrementally higher increase in share price informativeness among ﬁrms with higher state
ownership. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the prediction in hypothesis H2 and suggests that abolishing restricted shares indeed leads
to an improvement in corporate transparency in Chinese listed ﬁrms. As a robustness check, these tests are replicated by
replacing the state ownership variable (STATE) with a dummy variable set to 1 for ﬁrms with state ownership higher than 30%
and 0 otherwise, and similar results in support of the hypotheses are obtained.
The results in Table 2 are robust to alternative measures of share price informativeness as well as controls of ﬁrm size,
growth opportunity, leverage, proﬁtability, trading volume, corporate governance variables, and industry and regional effects.
Consistent with the untabulated results of the bivariate correlation analyses, Table 2 shows, ﬁrstly, that the share price
informativeness measures (dependent variables) have signiﬁcantly negative relationships with ﬁrm size (lnSIZE) and
signiﬁcantly positive relationships with leverage (LEV). Secondly, it shows that share price informativeness measures have
signiﬁcantly positive relationships with proﬁtability (IROA) and board independence (BINDP). The former result is consistent
with more proﬁtable ﬁrms having less need to manipulate earnings and the latter is consistent with independent directors
being more effective in promoting corporate transparency.
Table 3 uses the proportion of restricted shares to total shares to identify those ﬁrms in the sample that are more
sensitive to the reform. This provides a further robustness test of the ﬁndings in Table 2 that were based on the
proportion of state ownership. Notice throughout Table 3 that the coefﬁcient pertaining to RESTRICT is signiﬁcantly
negative, which indicates that ﬁrms with more restricted shares indeed had a weaker information environment prior to
the reform and again conﬁrms hypothesis H1. The coefﬁcients of the interaction term between RESTRICT and SSSR are all
signiﬁcantly positive, which indicates that ﬁrms more sensitive to the impact of the reform are indeed associated with
more share price informativeness following the reform. Since the Split Share Structure Reform is directly relevant to
restricted shares, the ﬁndings in Table 3 provide further evidence in favor of the prediction in hypothesis H2. Firms with
a higher proportion of restricted shares are likely to experience a greater reduction in the conﬂict of interests between
the shareholders of restricted and tradable shares. The ﬁndings in Table 3 are also robust to the control of ﬁrm char-
acteristics, corporate governance, both industry and regional effects (Regression 2), and bootstrapped median regressions
(Regression 3).
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4.2.1. Alternative model speciﬁcation and daily returns
Tables 4 and 5 replicate the analyses in Tables 2 and 3 using share price informativeness measures estimated from
alternative model speciﬁcations (see Section 3.1) using daily returns. In Regression 1 the share price informativeness measure
accounts for daily returns of a market portfolio based on all A shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges (Equation (2)).
In Regression 2, the measure also accounts for daily returns on the US market (Equation (3)). In Regression 3, the measure
accounts for industry-wide return variations (Equation (5)) following Gul et al. (2010). In Regression 4, share price infor-
mativeness is estimated using Equations (6a)–(6c) for Chinese listed ﬁrms that issue purely A shares, B shares, and H shares
respectively. In both Tables 4 and 5, the coefﬁcients of STATE and RESTRICT are consistently negatively signiﬁcant, which
supports hypothesis H1. Throughout Table 4 (5) the coefﬁcients pertaining to the interactive term between STATE (RESTRICT)
and SSSR are signiﬁcantly positive, which supports hypothesis H2. This suggests that the ﬁndings in support of both
hypotheses are not sensitive to using alternative model speciﬁcations or data frequencies to estimate share price
informativeness.
4.2.2. Excluding reform selection year
Table 6 replicates the tests in Tables 2 and 3 by excluding ﬁrm observations in the year the ﬁrms began to implement the
reform (Regressions 2 and 4 are based on a bootstrapped median regression). Although the Chinese government ﬁnalized its
intention to enact the Split Share Structure Reform throughout the entire stock market at the end of 2005, individual ﬁrms
were selected in batches to carry out the implementation (see Section 2.3 for details of the reform process). The ﬁrst year of
implementation for each ﬁrm is excluded because news regarding the proposed compensation scheme and the process of
negotiation and voting may have provided ﬁrm-speciﬁc information that could be captured by the share price informa-
tiveness measure. Since this has nothing to do with the voluntary improvement of corporate transparency, if the ﬁndings in
Tables 2 and 3 were driven by changes in share price informativeness in this ﬁrst year of implementation, then one would
havewrongly inferred from the results that the reform has improved the information environment. Across Table 6, ﬁrms withTable 6
Robustness tests with ﬁrm-speciﬁc initial year of reform excluded from sample.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 7.6124 (24.60)*** 6.5325 (22.27)*** 7.6907 (23.38)*** 6.7165 (24.99)***
STATE 0.1541 (2.72)*** 0.1983 (4.64)***
RESTRICT 0.3424 (2.82)*** 0.3445 (2.85)***
SSSR 0.0062 (0.14) 0.1175 (3.01)*** 0.4478 (5.30)*** 0.3583 (3.99)***
STATE  SSSR 0.2894 (2.93)*** 0.2134 (2.59)***
RESTRICT  SSSR 1.1343 (7.34)*** 0.6410 (4.42)***
lnSIZE 0.2913 (19.86)*** 0.2424 (17.29)*** 0.2879 (19.90)*** 0.2455 (22.59)***
MB 0.0123 (3.82)*** 0.0134 (5.20)*** 0.0121 (3.73)*** 0.0129 (3.92)***
LEV 0.4564 (9.17)*** 0.4198 (7.29)*** 0.4310 (8.62)*** 0.4341 (9.20)***
IROA 2.6745 (3.59)*** 2.1978 (2.84)*** 2.3270 (3.12)*** 2.4508 (3.85)***
VOL 0.0136 (3.69)*** 0.0088 (2.08)** 0.0137 (3.70)*** 0.0093 (2.24)**
CHOLD 0.0116 (0.42) 0.0009 (0.04) 0.0192 (0.70) 0.0027 (0.10)
CDUAL 0.1297 (1.21) 0.1672 (1.75)* 0.1423 (1.34) 0.1611 (2.15)**
BINDP 0.1749 (5.53)*** 0.1408 (3.03)*** 0.1682 (5.33)*** 0.1354 (3.23)***
BSIZE 0.0044 (0.17) 0.0005 (0.02) 0.0023 (0.09) 0.0102 (0.52)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
BSQREG No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0999 0.1051
Pseudo R2 0.0629 0.0635
Observations 8634 8634 8634 8634
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are not imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. Observations in the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁrst year of reform are also excluded from the sample. The dependent variable is the share price informativeness measureJ2 derived from the
residual variances of time-series regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly excess returns on Chinese domestic and US stock market weekly excess returns. STATE
(RESTRICT) is the ratio of state (restricted) shares to the total shares in the listed ﬁrm. SSSR is 1 for the years 2006–2008, and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is the natural
log of market capitalization. MB is the market-to-book value. LEV is the debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROA is the industry median-adjusted return on assets,
measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volumemeasured as turnover. CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings
above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as board chairman and
0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with proportion of independent directors above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with
board size above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled for in the
analyses. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al. (2006). For brevity the
coefﬁcients of the ten industry dummy variables and three regional dummy variables are not reported. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the control of
industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2. Regression 3 uses a bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R2. All t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
Table 7
Robustness tests using the ﬁrm-speciﬁc reform periods.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 8.6679 (25.95)*** 7.7943 (22.74)*** 8.5916 (25.01)*** 7.7505 (22.18)***
STATE 0.1773 (3.09)*** 0.2042 (3.80)***
RESTRICT 0.4672 (3.66)*** 0.4675 (2.65)***
REFORM 0.1950 (4.54)*** 0.0060 (0.14) 0.4082 (4.42)*** 0.4334 (3.52)***
STATE  REFORM 0.5452 (6.13)*** 0.5013 (4.13)***
RESTRICT  REFORM 1.5579 (9.60)*** 1.2284 (6.20)***
lnSIZE 0.3346 (24.34)*** 0.2943 (25.73)*** 0.3211 (23.86)*** 0.2857 (22.68)***
MB 0.0036 (1.21) 0.0077 (2.20)** 0.0033 (1.08) 0.0069 (1.78)*
LEV 0.3773 (7.84)*** 0.3753 (11.65)*** 0.3757 (7.85)*** 0.3932 (6.92)***
IROA 2.6056 (3.59)*** 2.6056 (3.97)*** 2.0107 (2.75)*** 2.1641 (2.73)***
VOL 0.0183 (4.91)*** 0.0101 (3.18)*** 0.0176 (4.70)*** 0.0129 (3.88)***
CHOLD 0.0117 (0.45) 0.0004 (0.01) 0.0170 (0.66) 0.0162 (0.46)
CDUAL 0.0988 (0.93) 0.0910 (0.92) 0.1001 (0.95) 0.2108 (2.05)**
BINDP 0.1330 (4.34)*** 0.1186 (4.36)*** 0.1267 (4.17)*** 0.1031 (3.16)***
BSIZE 0.0058 (0.24) 0.0099 (0.37) 0.0056 (0.23) 0.0108 (0.46)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
BSQREG No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.0968
Pseudo R2 0.0525 0.0554
Observations 9871 9871 9871 9871
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers all Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2008. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are not imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. The dependent variable
is the share price informativeness measure J2 derived from the residual variances of time-series regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly excess returns on
Chinese domestic and US stock market weekly excess returns. STATE (RESTRICT) is the ratio of state (restricted) shares to the total shares in the listed ﬁrm.
REFORM is 1 for the year in which the compensation payout plan was ratiﬁed for the ﬁrm in question and all years after that, and 0 for all years before that.
lnSIZE is the natural log of market capitalization.MB is the market-to-book value. LEV is the debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROA is the industry median-adjusted
return on assets, measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volume measured as turnover. CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with
CEO shareholdings above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as
board chairman and 0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with proportion of independent directors above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise.
BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with board size above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region effect indicate whether these effects
are controlled for in the analyses. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al.
(2006). For brevity the coefﬁcients of the ten industry dummy variables and three regional dummy variables are not reported. Regression 1 (2) excludes
(includes) the control of industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2. Regression 3 uses a bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports
pseudo R2. All t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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reform and a greater increase in share price informativeness after the reform, which conﬁrms the predictions in both
hypotheses. This ensures that the ﬁndings are not driven by news related to the compensation negotiation process that is
unrelated to ﬁrm disclosure.
4.2.3. Firm-speciﬁc reform effect
Table 7 replicates the analyses in Tables 2 and 3 by deﬁning the reform period based on the ﬁrm-speciﬁc year inwhich each
ﬁrmwas actually chosen to begin the process (Regressions 2 and 4 are based on bootstrappedmedian regressions). As argued
earlier, the alignment of interests between state and private shareholders to ensure managers maximize the market value of
their ﬁrm should have begun from 2006 onward, after the Chinese government made clear its decision to abolish restricted
shares. Knowing that all trading restrictions on their shares would be lifted in due course, state shareholders would be likely
to begin to step up their demands for managers to focus more on share return performance even before the actual imple-
mentation process commenced, since it takes time to adjust corporate strategy and make business decisions (see Section 2.4
for detailed discussion). However, to check that the ﬁnding of improved corporate transparency persists after each ﬁrm has
been chosen to enact the reform process, the market-level variable SSSR is replaced with the ﬁrm-level variable REFORM. This
variable is set to 1 for the year in which the compensation payout plan was ratiﬁed for the ﬁrm in question and for all years
afterward, and to 0 for the years before this. Across Table 7, inferences that are similar to those in Tables 2 and 3 can be drawn,
namely that ﬁrms more sensitive to the impact of the reform are associated with signiﬁcantly greater improvements in
corporate transparency, as measured by share price informativeness. This suggests that the increase in information disclosure
is not limited to the expectation period, between the CSRC’s launch of the reform at the end of 2005 and the actual
commencement of each ﬁrm’s reform process.
4.2.4. Excluding IFRS period
Table 8 replicates the tests in Table 7 by excluding the time period in which mandatory IFRS could affect the share price
movements of Chinese listed ﬁrms. China enacted IFRS across all listed ﬁrms for the ﬁscal year of 2007. Since all Chinese ﬁrms
Table 8
Robustness tests excluding 2008 when IFRS may affect the information environment.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4
Intercept 13.8328 (23.87)*** 12.6436 (23.29)*** 14.0850 (21.98)*** 12.9676 (19.54)***
STATE 0.1924 (2.51)** 0.1455 (2.68)***
RESTRICT 0.4796 (2.75)*** 0.5029 (3.45)***
REFORM 1.2788 (14.78)*** 1.0280 (11.78)*** 0.9567 (5.65)*** 0.5672 (3.53)***
STATE  REFORM 0.5573 (3.32)*** 0.4352 (3.59)***
RESTRICT  REFORM 0.8841 (3.11)*** 1.0444 (4.65)***
lnSIZE 0.5615 (26.69)*** 0.5004 (27.46)*** 0.5622 (25.39)*** 0.4955 (20.90)***
MB 0.0028 (0.48) 0.0127 (2.77)*** 0.0018 (0.31) 0.0104 (1.81)*
LEV 0.5615 (6.05)*** 0.6847 (10.05)*** 0.5585 (5.99)*** 0.6679 (7.89)***
IROA 2.4878 (1.90)* 5.4410 (7.07)*** 2.4305 (1.84)* 5.2839 (4.94)***
VOL 0.0828 (11.89)*** 0.0657 (9.42)*** 0.0806 (11.28)*** 0.0592 (8.47)***
CHOLD 0.0271 (0.69) 0.0006 (0.01) 0.0324 (0.82) 0.0029 (0.10)
CDUAL 0.1548 (1.06) 0.0763 (0.34) 0.1697 (1.15) 0.1359 (0.75)
BINDP 0.1186 (2.44)** 0.1090 (2.72)*** 0.1138 (2.35)** 0.0928 (2.82)***
BSIZE 0.0033 (0.09) 0.0306 (1.36) 0.0060 (0.16) 0.0391 (1.39)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
BSQREG No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.1495 0.1491
Pseudo R2 0.0825 0.0829
Observations 8019 8019 8019 8019
This table presents regression analyses. The sample covers Chinese listed ﬁrms over 2001–2007. Firms listed after the launch of the Split Share Structure
Reform (2006 onwards) are excluded because trading constraints are not imposed on them, and they are not affected by the reform. Observations in the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁrst year of reform are excluded from sample. The dependent variable is the share price informativeness measureJ2 derived from the residual
variances of time-series regressions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc weekly excess returns on Chinese domestic and US stock market weekly excess returns. STATE
(RESTRICT) is the ratio of state (restricted) shares to the total shares in the listed ﬁrm. SSSR is 1 for the years 2006–2008, and 0 otherwise. lnSIZE is the natural
log of market capitalization. MB is the market-to-book value. LEV is the debt-to-total-assets ratio. IROA is the industry median-adjusted return on assets,
measured as operating income divided by total assets. VOL is trading volumemeasured as turnover. CHOLD is set equal to 1 for ﬁrms with CEO shareholdings
above top 75th or below bottom 25th percentile of yearly cross-section, and 0 otherwise. CDUAL is 1 for ﬁrms with CEO also serving as board chairman and
0 otherwise. BINDP is 1 for ﬁrms with proportion of independent directors above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. BSIZE is 1 for ﬁrms with
board size above the yearly cross-sectional median and 0 otherwise. Industry effect and region effect indicate whether these effects are controlled for in the
analyses. The industry classiﬁcation is based on the ﬁrst two digits of the GICS code. The region classiﬁcation is based on Firth et al. (2006). For brevity the
coefﬁcients of the ten industry dummy variables and three regional dummy variables are not reported. Regression 1 (2) excludes (includes) the control of
industry and regional effects and reports adjusted R2. Regression 3 uses a bootstrapped median regression (BSQREG) and reports pseudo R2. All t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. The t-statistics for Regressions 1 and 2 are adjusted for ﬁrm clustering. *, **, and *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
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only after that will changes in the accounting standards have the potential to inﬂuence their share prices. As indicated in Table
8, after excluding 2008 from the sample, the tests acquire results that are consistent with the ﬁndings in Tables 2 and 3. This
suggests that the ﬁndings in support of hypothesis H2 are not due to the introduction of IFRS.
5. Conclusion
This study shows that the Split Share Structure Reform has increased the share price informativeness of Chinese listed
ﬁrms, especially those with higher levels of state ownership and restricted shares. Improved corporate transparency is ex-
pected to reduce the cost of equity capital for these ﬁrms, which will also reduce their dependence on government ﬁnancial
support. Future research could also look into the effect of this reform on other restricted shareholders that are not state-
afﬁliated.11 For instance, how inﬂuential are these shareholders on the corporate governance of Chinese listed ﬁrms? What is
the impact of this reform on their shareholdings?While these are research questions beyond the scope of this study, they are
worth exploring given the uniqueness of the institutional setting in China.
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